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Professor Monique C. Lillard: Welcome. My name is Monique
Lillard. I teach at the University of Idaho College of Law and I'm the
Chair of the Section on Employment Discrimination Law of the
AALS. On behalf of that section, the Section on Minority Groups,
and the Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, I'd like to
welcome you to this session.
As all of you know, earlier this year the United States Supreme
Court decided cases on the University of Michigan's affirmative
action admissions program. In Grutter v. Bollinger,' the use of race in
law school admissions was allowed. In Gratz v. Bollinger,2 the use of
race in admissions to the undergraduate school was not allowed
because the procedures were insufficiently individualized. Those
cases were decided under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution and involved admission of students to public
educational institutions.
Our goal today is to consider application of the University of
Michigan cases to employment law rather than education law, in both
the public and private sectors. I want to thank past Section Chair
Cyndi Nance and current Chair-elect Joe Slater for their suggestions
concerning this panel, along with Marley Weiss, Doug Scherer,
Sharon Hoffman and others on the Executive Committee of the
Section, and also Beverly Moran of the Section on Minority Groups,
because we spent a lot of time thinking about who should be on this
panel and what should be discussed. I should let you know that this
session is being taped and will be published in the Employee Rights
* Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law, Program Moderator, and Chair,
AALS Section on Employment Discrimination Law.
1. 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2. 539 U.S. 244, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
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and Employment Policy Journal, which is co-published by Chicago-
Kent College of Law and Workplace Fairness.
What I'm going to do now is introduce the panelists in the order
that they will speak, then we will quickly proceed to the first speaker.
I could take a whole hour and a half just talking about the credentials
of our panelists, but I will be brief. The first panelist will be Deborah
Malamud, who teaches at NYU. She was teaching at Michigan at the
time of these cases. The second will be Miranda Oshige McGowan,
who teaches at the University of Minnesota. She has been thinking
and writing about affirmative action for some time. Third will be
Charles Shanor, who teaches right here in Atlanta at Emory. He
served as General Counsel for the EEOC from 1987 to 1990. And
finally we have Robert Belton, who teaches at Vanderbilt and worked
on the Griggs' and Albemarle Paper Company' cases when they were
litigated, and now is working on a book about Griggs. So, I will turn
it over now to Deborah Malamud.
Professor Deborah C. Malamud: One thing I'll say anecdotally
before I get serious is that most of the writing that I've done on
affirmative action, in fact I think I can safely say all of it, has been in
an area that was potentially very important in the Grutter case, and
did actually show up in dissenting opinions. It was the question of
issues of class and affirmative action: how one should think about the
class composition of the group of affirmative action beneficiaries, etc.
We all awaited these cases for their public significance but also for
their personal significance, and I was just sitting there with a crash
helmet hoping that an opinion would not come down saying that the
reason the University of Michigan Law School failed is that it
believed Malamud when she said that class based alternatives
wouldn't work. So, I had my own particular nervousness there, and
that turned out not to be a central issue in Justice O'Connor's opinion
at all.
I am going to just briefly introduce some of the themes that I
think will be coming out in other people's talks and also introduce
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter itself. I want to flag the little bit
that's clear in Justice O'Connor's opinion and the many important
things that are not clear. I then will talk about some of the ways in
which the higher education admissions context and the context of
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
4. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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non-higher education employment differ from each other, and then
talk about the ways one might see the clarities and ambiguities in
Grutter playing themselves out across the differences between the
admissions and the employment settings, using one of the very few
cases that's actually been decided in the employment setting post-
Grutter as an example. Since time may run short, the most important
thing that I'm going to be doing is introducing Grutter and leaving the
rest of the hard work to everyone else.
So, here's the one thing that you know that's clear about Grutter,
and I think it will be clear to most of you immediately why this will be
so significant in thinking about the employment context. The thing
that is clearest about Grutter is its contrast with the opinion of the
Court in Gratz, in which the undergraduate institution's affirmative
action program was quite soundly rejected. The difference is what
O'Connor needed and got in the law school case, but did not get in
the undergraduate case, which is chiefly, highly individualized
decision-making as to each individual candidate. This was stressed
throughout her opinion. What the law school presented was decision-
making that Justice O'Connor was prepared to acknowledge was
individualized, quite non-standardized, quite subjective, and very
non-quantitative, which matched an ideal that she had already
expressed in other affirmative action cases, and in some employment
cases as well,' which is an ideal of purely individualized non-
stereotyped decision-making. She complained about the lack of this
in a case like Croson, celebrated the presence of it here, and
complains about its absence any time she talks about the problems of
unconstitutional discrimination being problems of improper
stereotyping. So the lack of stereotyping becomes very important
here, and I'll talk about how it manifests itself in the affirmative
action setting in higher education and might be difficult to see
happening in the employment setting.
That's what's clear, I think. What's ambiguous actually is more
important. The decision's more ambiguous than clear and it's on the
5. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343-45.
6. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94, 508 (1989); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 655-56 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 493-95 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
7. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 87 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1993).
8. 488 U.S. at 469.
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ambiguous issues that the battles are going to be fought. Most of the
ambiguities I'll be talking about have to do with what exactly we
mean by diversity, to what extent exactly the decision in Grutter
turned on principles of deference and what those principles of
deference really were.
Ambiguity number one in the area of diversity is diversity of
what? Diversity's going to be said to be a compelling interest. What
exactly is diversity supposed to be? And, one way of asking that
question - there are many but the one that I'll pick for these purposes
- is to say, within a particular minority group, let's say African-
Americans, is every member of that group equally capable of
satisfying the institution's diversity needs? Is the plus factor for
diversity one that simply adds a plus to every member of the qualified
minority groups or does there need to be something more
individualized than that in the understanding of what diversity is?
And, of course, there have always been debates about whether
Bakke-esque9 diversity is about viewpoint, whether it's about
experience, whether the whole point of diversity is to teach
everybody that there is no such thing as a common minority
viewpoint or experience. And, in a way, the way to test what diversity
concepts you're working with is simply to ask whether every member
of this group counts? Is it appropriate for an institution to operate a
diversity program in which every member of the group counts, or
does there need to be something more finely tuned aimed at what this
diversity goal really is?
This is not entirely clear in the opinion in Grutter, although one
thing I certainly can say is that the position of the law school, and I
believe that Justice O'Connor picks up on this to some extent, is that
it does not give the same plus to all members of whatever particular
minority group is involved; that it is a far more finely tuned question
about what - in terms of experience, because it's always important
not to say viewpoint - what in terms of experience related to
membership in that particular group a particular person brings.
The questioning in trial never pushed on this question enough for
there to be a record on who exactly you have to be for your
membership in a group not to count or how these individualized
decisions are made; but it was in the record that they were in fact
more individualized then merely group membership. One of the
9. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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ambiguities in the opinion is whether that's necessary - whether the
stress on individualization of decision-making requires not merely
that race, in addition to other factors, be considered - but how much
race is going to count as a factor, or whether it will count at all. In my
view, that is what needs to be individualized.
Another area of ambiguity that I think will have significance in
the employment setting is the question of diversity for what purpose,
or what is the diversity interest itself exactly? As the case was
litigated, as you well might imagine, Bakke was quite central, and one
of the ambiguities in Justice O'Connor's opinion is whether she was
following Bakke or making it up. She says she's not relying on stare
decisis, but she sure talks a lot about Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke.0 That matters less for our purposes, but the fact that there is
a lack of clarity about that also suggests that there is a lack of clarity
about whether the particular diversity interest she's endorsing is
precisely the diversity interest that Justice Powell was clearer in
endorsing and distinguishing in his opinion in Bakke. Justice Powell,
in Bakke, made it quite clear, in the setting of that case, that the
interest he was endorsing was an interest based on the institution's
own internal educational environment:" diversity of discussion in the
classroom; or diversity of exchange of ideas and experience in a
campus at large, as distinct from, for example, another interest
University of California at Davis' Medical School raised but rejected,
which is an interest in making sure that medical schools train doctors
that will serve minority communities, or other kinds of interests that I
would define here as end user interests, interests that are not so much
defined by the university's own privileged internal processes, but by
the university's judgment of what it means to produce for a market
out there.
Justice Powell was quite clear that he was endorsing one of these
and not the other. I think in reading Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Grutter there are times that she seems to be talking about the Bakke
classroom diversity justification and, in fact, cites social science data
that was brought into the case by the university to defend that sort of
diversity,12 but the rhetoric of the opinion, at least, goes beyond that
and talks about the importance of training lawyers to participate in
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339, 2342-45 (2003).
11. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
12. Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2340.
132 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 8:127
public life, coming from all groups within a society, questions that
Miranda will talk about as questions of democratic legitimacy. Are
they part of the rationale or are they window dressing? It's actually
very difficult to tell that from the opinion, and, given the move into
the employment context, it will be important to know whether
diversity is only going to count if you happen to have an employment
setting that is structured for the free exchange of ideas. There are
different views about what the American workplace really is
structured for, but I think many of us think it's not quite structured
for that, although many of us have aspirations that it should be. The
view of what exists on the ground might be a more pessimistic one,
and, therefore, what diversity to reach what goal matters as to
whether there ought to be any carryover from Grutter into the
employment setting.
Ambiguities three, four and five that I'll flag all have to do with
the question of deference and how the issue of deference plays out in
the O'Connor majority opinion in the Grutter case. One has just to
note that there is a lot of talk in this opinion about deference, the
deference that the university is due in its judgment of what its
interests are and their compellingness,1 and in the means chosen to
address the university's perceived needs." But there's also, because
I'm talking about ambiguities, lots of language in the opinion that
suggests that it really isn't a deference-based opinion at all. Because
Justice O'Connor will say things like, we defer to the university's
judgment and, by the way, we agree and not only do we agree but so
do Fortune 500 companies and so does the military." To the extent
the discussion is structured that way, it's difficult to see it as a First
Amendment university deference decision. Again, this is going to
matter because if you're not a university with privileged First
Amendment status, it is unclear whether you are going to get
deferred to. And this is an area of ambiguity in the opinions, because
just like we seem to be following Bakke but are not, there seems to be
deferring and deferring, not just because of some temporal judgment
about the importance of universities, but because of First
Amendment interpretations that have said that we must defer to
universities because of principles of academic freedom when it comes
13. Id. at 2341.
14. Id. at 2339.
15. Id. at 2344-46.
16. Id. at 2340.
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to defining their own educational missions. Not many employers will
be able to claim special entitlement to deference of this sort and, in
fact, given strict scrutiny, there are certainly four members of the
court who were quite shocked to see even universities being given this
deference in this particular setting.
Another ambiguity as to deference is deference to whom? Who
do we see the decision-maker being that we're deferring to? Does it
matter at which level of an organization, for example, decisions are
being made? And one way to raise this puzzle, something not raised
in the case at all, is in the Michigan law school case. There's a great
deal of back and forth between the majority and dissenting opinions
about whether Michigan created its own problems by insisting on
being both a diverse law school and an elite law school, and Justice
O'Connor ultimately agrees with the law school that part of this
realm in which deference is appropriate is to the university's decision
to be both elite and diverse." But you might want to ask yourself
whether it's really quite accurate to see that as the decision of the
university, which is the bearer of the entitlement to First Amendment
deference. On some level they may really just be decisions of state
legislatures, because after all how much money you allocate from a
state budget to higher education and how you allocate that budget
among your state universities is shaped by the decision that's really at
issue here, which is the decision of whether you're going to have an
elite flagship. Something that the majority opinion simply doesn't
discuss, and it's not really discussed by the dissenters either, is the
question of whether ultimately we are deferring to a university's
judgment here or whether we're deferring to the political judgment of
the state legislature. If the former, we have the first amendment; if the
latter, we have a direct conflict with Croson which has said the state
legislatures are entitled to absolutely zero deference when it comes to
any issues having to do with race discrimination.8 And, of course, the
question of the identity of the decision-maker who might get
deference would show up in the employment setting as well.
Ambiguity number five is deference as to what, and I've raised
this a little bit too. Is it deference to the university's or other
employer's own understanding of the needs of its internal operations?
Is it deference to its understanding of its societal role? There's an
area of ambiguity too.
17. Id. at 2339, 2345.
18. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
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The final ambiguity is in a different area and that's the question
of how long you can do affirmative action. There is the magical hope
and expectation that it will continue indefinitely, notwithstanding
Justice O'Connor's statement that twenty-five years really ought to be
enough.19 And there are lots of questions about what you're doing
when you're thinking about time limitation of affirmative action
cases.
Very, very quickly, what I want to do now is just flag some of the
ways in which employment situations and higher education situations
are different ways that will have these ambiguities playing out. I
won't talk about the particular case I was going to talk about because
I think others will, and it will come up anyway. One is what
employers do, particularly what large employers do, and this area is
generally numbers driven. It is not a sort of philosophically
interesting or metaphysically interesting concept of critical mass.
They're usually only interested in numbers. It is not at all clear
whether that will fly, or what side of the Grutter-Gratz distinction
we'll be on there. Something that might be significant is that part of
the chemistry that the critical mass concept was built around in higher
education is the idea that you are admitting a class which has a kind
of corporate identity, and you're looking to strike a particular balance
within it. Will incremental hiring decisions into a larger work force
be seen as areas where the same kind of thinking and judgment can
operate? You certainly have tendencies, particularly in larger
bureaucratized employment settings, for employment decision-
making to be standardized, quantified through testing, versus
individualized and subjective. This, Vicki Shultz would say, is related
in large part to the command position of the personnel management
field and its way of exercising control over line supervisors.2 0 If what
you need for affirmative action is very subjective open-ended
decision-making, you might well not find it because it's not in the
interest or structure of businesses on these principles to have it.
We have the issue I've already flagged, which is will diversity-
type principles apply only in environments where the facilitation of
open expression is the institutional mission? In most workplaces that
is not the institutional mission, and it is tolerated only at the margins.
How will that be dealt with in deciding whether this is a diversity
19. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346-47 (2003).
20. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
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bearing kind of institution? And then, finally, there are others I could
list, but the last one I'll raise is, in any kind of narrow tailoring
discussion you have to ask yourself whether the particulars of who
your diversity-eligible groups are match whatever it is you say your
compelling need is.
And I'll just end with this because it's provocative, nasty and
hopefully will trigger some discussion. If you have Fortune 500
companies saying, as they said in their briefs, that it's extremely
important to have a diverse work force in order to function in a global
marketplace - I mean this is almost the slogan - ask yourself which
part of the global marketplace is most likely to be viewed by
American businesses as a major area of growth and opportunity. And
I think except maybe for South Africa, the entire content of Africa
would not come up on that list. So if you are Fortune 500 business
trying to shape a diversity policy based on your global need, wouldn't
you be looking to vastly over-represent Chinese-Americans or
speakers of Asian languages, wouldn't you care not very much at all
to have African-Americans, long removed from their African roots,
because what does that have to do with globalization? The question
of whether one type of cultural diversity within a workplace will be
accepted as narrowly tailored for achieving needs that may require a
very different type of cultural diversity is one of the ways in which
employment cases will test what the meaning of the diversity concept
in Grutter actually is.
Professor Miranda Oshige McGowan*: Thank you very much and
good afternoon. First, I want to thank Monique so much for
including me in this panel. I very much appreciate it.
What I'd like to do today in talking about what effect Grutter has
on employment discrimination law, affirmative action in the
employment context, is focus on two major aspects of Grutter and
employment discrimination law. The first main area that I want to
explore is that Grutter is an equal protection case. In the employment
law context we not only have equal protection as the governing law in
the public employer context, but we also have Title VII, which
governs private employers. I'm going to be talking a little bit about
how I think Title VII really handles affirmative action and will
continue to handle affirmative action quite differently than the
Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. Then the second
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
136 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 8:127
main area that I want to talk about, and this continues on with some
of Deborah's points, is the diversity interest in the context of the
admission to law school - are there any corollaries that we can draw
in the employment context.
When I'm talking about what Grutter's admissions context has to
say for the employment context more generally, I'd like to leave aside
the area of employment law that we're all most familiar with, faculty
hiring, because I think that most of you have probably thought longer
and more deeply about it than I have. I will focus instead on the
private employment context and on a recent case that Deborah didn't
get to, Petit v. City of Chicago,2 1 which is a public employer police
department case.
First let me talk a little about Grutter and its jurisprudence,
equal protection, and what if anything, I think it has to say for Title
VII law. After Grutter, and reading the court's affirmative action
equal protection jurisprudence as a whole, I think that it's pretty clear
that when you are a public institution you have two possible
permissible compelling state interests. The first one is remedying past
discrimination within a given institution, and the second one is
diversity. It's not diversity of viewpoints, because Deborah is right,
that is a third rail and runs into race essentialism, gender essentialism,
and stereotyping; instead it is this notion of diversity of life
experience and how that kind of diversity might affect a given
institution.
Title VII is really quite different from the Equal Protection
Clause in this respect. Affirmative action under Title VII doesn't
count as discrimination if it's part of a valid affirmative action plan.
So, if you use race or gender as part of a valid affirmative action plan
you haven't discriminated. But, on the other hand, there's really only
one permissible reason, as far as I can tell, that an employer can
actually engage in affirmative action pursuant to a valid affirmative
action plan under Title VII. That is a remedial purpose. That is, you
as an employer are trying to remedy past discrimination including
perhaps, and this is slightly broader than the equal protection context,
the effects of societal discrimination on the labor pool or your current
employee pool. There are also a number of other factors for a valid
affirmative action plan, which do have some analogues to the equal
protection context. You must have individualized assessment; the
21. 352 F. 3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
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affirmative action measures must be temporary; there has to be a
single yardstick for all candidates; and you can't have the goal of
achieving racial balance. But I think the main thing to take away
from here is that the permissible goal in the Title VII context is really
just this remedial one. Diversity just has not been developed as a
permissible reason for adopting an affirmative action plan under Title
VII. Here I really rely on the opinions of Justice O'Connor. Her
jurisprudence has really hammered this remedial justification. She has
said that she sees affirmative action as an exception to Title VII: the
text of Title VII is actually clear, it would ban affirmative action
because affirmative action is discrimination on the basis of race. But
because the purpose of Title VII is to efface the persisting effects of
discrimination, you can't have the absurd result of prohibiting
employers from actually trying to ameliorate past discrimination.2 So
in this narrow remedial context she's willing to allow affirmative
action.
Let me just wrap up this first area. My sense is that Grutter really
doesn't have a lot to say about Title VII law because it's really
focused, not on the remedial aspects of affirmative action or on the
remedial purpose of affirmative action, but rather on the diversity
context. And so far I have just not seen diversity developed in the
case law (except in this Petit case, which I'll talk about in a bit), and I
don't expect to see it with Justice O'Connor on the Court.
The second major area that I'd like to talk about today is the
analogy of the university context to the employment context. Here, I
might be able to offer some caveats to my dour prediction that
Grutter doesn't have anything to say about Title VII and doesn't
expand Title VII. Let me flag what I think are the two most
fascinating aspects of the Grutter opinion.
The first thing that I found just absolutely fascinating about
Grutter was the amount of deference the Court says that it's giving to
the university to define its mission, to design the kind of affirmative
action plan that the University of Michigan actually employed, and to
decide what education is for and what educational methods are
actually best.23 The second thing that I found really fascinating about
the Grutter opinion was the Court's excitement about the Fortune 500
and General Motors brief, and the retired general's brief, which all
talked about how very important diverse workforces are to competing
22. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003).
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in a global marketplace and also to harmony in the workplace.2 4 One
fascinating thing about the Grutter opinion is, does the fact that the
Supreme Court seems to be so seduced by the GM brief, the Fortune
500 brief, and the retired general's brief signal that employers may
also receive some greater deference in the amount of leeway that
they're given in defining their affirmative action plans? In other
words, might they be able to do affirmative action for something
other than remedial purposes? I have to say that I don't think that it
signals any such thing. For most employers in the service and
manufacturing industries, as for most private employers, I don't think
that the Supreme Court has signaled in Grutter that it's going to be
paying them any greater deference than it has in the Title VII context
generally. As Deborah mentioned, I think that the key to the reason
why the Supreme Court is paying the University of Michigan so much
deference in the Grutter case is that the university's definition of its
educational mission is very much tied up in the notions of academic
freedom and the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court would
like to steer clear of that. I also think that the Supreme Court is
concerned about the appearance of democratic legitimacy and the
appearance that channels to power remain open. The university
serves an important gate-keeping function in minting the new leaders
of the next generation.
I don't think these concerns are really present in most
workplaces. Most workplaces that are involved in services or
manufacturing don't have First Amendment concerns. They're not
expressive workplaces; they're concerned with making products or
delivering some service to a customer. And most private employment
situations don't really have any connection to democratic legitimacy
in the way that the university gate-keeping function does. Moreover,
I think that the Supreme Court in its Title VII jurisprudence has
really signaled that it doesn't see any reason at all ever to give
employers deference when they're defining what their business is
about, or really even on how they ought to be carrying on their
businesses. I'm thinking here of the BFOQ cases, where the Supreme
Court has really, really taken a strong hand in telling employers what
the essence of their business is, and telling them what the essence of
their business isn't, and telling employers how they can use national
origin selection and gender-based employment rules to facilitate
24. Id. at 2340.
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those business ends.25 The Supreme Court has taken a pretty dim
view of employers' motives in these cases. It has felt pretty free to
examine closely what employers' businesses are about and tell them
how they ought to conduct their business.
There's one major caveat to what I've said. There may be one
area in employment law, mostly in the public employment law
context, where both the diversity rationale will be possible and where
we might expect to see the Court pay more deference to an
employer's definition of what its business is and how race-specific
policies, national-origin-specific policies, or sex-specific policies might
actually facilitate those ends. I think that major area will be in the
police context and in the corrections context. Here, racial diversity
might actually have some traction.
There was a very fascinating case that came down in November
from the Seventh Circuit. It's called Petit v. City of Chicago.26 It has a
tortured history. The case started in the early 1980s and actually
reaches back into the 1970s. It concerned the administration of,
basically, a verbal test to officer candidates in the Chicago Police
Department. This test could not be validated either as a predictor of
performance as a general matter or validated in terms of rank
ordering.2 7 So, higher performance on this test didn't necessarily
predict that you'd be a better police sergeant. There had been some
discussion by the African American police officers that they would
challenge this test if the City of Chicago didn't do something to
ameliorate what seemed to be a pretty severe disparate impact that
this test had on African American officers seeking promotion to the
officer corps in the City of Chicago Police Department.
What the City of Chicago did in the early 1980s was to race norm
the test.28 They picked a different mean for each of the tests, and
since this was pre-1991 Civil Rights Act, they were able to do this
legally. The test also was challenged under the Equal Protection
25. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (employer could not prohibit
women from jobs involving lead exposure because industrial safety and the welfare of future
generations was not the essence of employer's business); c.f. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977) (where the essence of the job is to maintain prison safety, height and weight
requirements that excluded most women from position as correctional counselor did not meet
the BFOQ exception); see also Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (though
safe transportation of passengers was the essence of employer's business, employer failed to
show that age was a legitimate proxy to determine flight engineers' ability to safely perform job
duties).
26. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
27. Id. at 1117.
28. Id.
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Clause. So there wasn't a race norming violation as there would be
today. Once they race-normed these tests, they ended up with a
promotion list whose racial composition roughly mirrored the
applicant list. So they had a really nice set of racially balanced officer
candidates coming out of the tested population.
The white candidates who had been denied promotion
challenged this as an invalid affirmative action plan. But the Seventh
Circuit recently upheld this plan and upheld the idea that affirmative
action is an appropriate remedy in this context, mostly on the basis of
a diversity rationale. The city's argument was, and this is a nice
analogy to the retired general's brief, that diversity in a police
department and in the officer corps of a police department is very
important to the operational interests of a police department in two
different ways: with regard to internal relations and the ability of
officers to supervise effectively rank and file police officers; and with
regard to external relationships with communities.2 9 If you had a
police department hat at its officer level was very racially segregated,
and you had precincts that were racially segregated along housing
lines, like they are in Chicago, you might actually create a lot of
needless tension that could be ameliorated by a more racially diverse
police department.o There was some evidence that the communities
believed that having minorities in substantial numbers in sergeant
positions and in other positions that interface with communities was
actually very important. There was also a lot of discussion about how
important it was to have racial representation among precinct
captains and sergeants because it set a tone for relationships between
the police and the community, as well as within the police officer
ranks. This police officer context parallels the university context in
the sense that there's a lovely analogy to democratic legitimacy. If
the people with guns are all white and they tend to use them against
minority populations, we have a real democratic legitimacy problem
or, at least in O'Connor's words, an appearance of a democratic
legitimacy problem. And racial representation in the officer corps in
the City of Chicago cures at least the appearance of the problem of
democratic illegitimacy.
29. Id. at 1114-15.
30. Id. at 1115.
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Professor Charles A. Shanor*: Thank you very much Monique
for inviting me to participate in this panel discussion. Before I move
into my substantive remarks, I would like to make one comment as
the local boy on the panel and that is that some of you may know, and
others of you may not know: our location is where the old Heart of
Atlanta Motel was located. This very tract of land has historical
significance. Once the case was lost in the Supreme Court the owner,
who is also a lawyer and who unsuccessfully argued his case before
the Supreme Court, sold his property. He sold it to the Hilton
Corporation for the highest price paid in Atlanta for any commercial
tract of land at the time.
Some of you also will be interested to know, in the just desserts
arena, that not only did he lose the case, but he subsequently met on
harder times and filed for bankruptcy. So anyway, this is an historic
tract of land, and we from Atlanta are delighted to have you here to
celebrate the change from the Heart of Atlanta days to the Hilton
Hotel days. For those of you who teach Constitutional Law, once
you've been in this location or even seen a picture of the old Heart of
Atlanta Motel, you can't imagine how the Supreme Court would have
had any doubt that this was an enterprise in interstate commerce.
I would like to talk about two things. I don't know that they tie
together terribly well, but I'll address them anyway. One is to talk
about Grutter and Gratz on more of a theoretical plane in terms of
the relationship between the theory of the case and the employment
context. Since much that I have to say plays on things Deborah and
Miranda have already said, I'll try not to be repetitive. The second
thing that I want to do is talk about practical effects on the
communities responsible on the ground for administering employ-
ment decisions in the workplaces of America, trying to get internal to
those who are making decisions post-Grutter and Gratz that relate to
employment issues.
I will back up for one minute to the core of the holdings of the
Supreme Court in these two cases. Holding one, of course, is that
diversity is a compelling governmental interest at least with respect to
higher education admissions.31 Beyond that we don't know how far
that compelling interest goes even in the equal protection context,
much less the Title VII context. Holding two is that individualized
considerations can be considered narrow enough tailoring, whereas
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2329 (2003).
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group based decision making, adding on numbers to scores, isn't
narrow tailoring.3 2 When individualized consideration is narrow
tailoring, the Court is fairly careful to say, it is done by educational
experts. Educational experts, of course, are problematic - the folks
who are making admissions decisions are not necessarily those who
are setting admissions policies. They are not the higher ups in the
educational enterprise. They tend to be staff employees who are
doing things in ways that they are hopeful will follow the policy
because, if not, their jobs could be in jeopardy or, at least, their kudos
for how they do their jobs. But at any rate, that's the pattern of the
two holdings - one on diversity as a compelling governmental interest
and the other on individualized consideration of applicants as narrow
tailoring. With respect to admissions versus employment, most of us
who deal with employment decisions are likely to respond that
individualization is the essence of most employer hiring and
promotion decisions. Sure, tests are used as a component of
individualized decision making. We might take a person who scores
high on a job related test as opposed to someone who scores low on a
job related test. Typically, we are not talking about getting a class of
people into a job, so individualization is something that is the every
day bread and butter of hiring and promotion decisions. I don't think
we're going to see the factor that distinguished Gratz and Grutter lead
to different outcomes, or being much of an issue, in the employment
context.
Now we do, of course, have classes of police officers and police
promotional candidates, and I can tell you from having spent many
hours litigating such cases in the mid-80s, in the middle of those kinds
of wars, that's not a typical employer, but it is an important employer
and it is important precisely because, as Miranda says, it has to do
with democratic legitimacy or at least the appearance thereof.
So, what I'd like to focus more on is the diversity rationale.
What I tend to do - we're all sort of victims of our own analogical
categories - is to compare the diversity rationale with the notion of
remedial purpose, manifest imbalance, in the Title VII area. Now,
manifest imbalance is an interesting concept as a trigger for an
affirmative action program - interesting because it relates to defen-
sive considerations of an employer. Can I defend against a disparate
impact claim? Am I really out on a limb in terms of exposure, if not
to liability, at least to the cost of litigation and possible settlement?
32. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244,123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003).
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Diversity, on the other hand, is not a defensive formulation for an
affirmative action plan, but is a positive statement. It's a positive
statement in Grutter and Gratz. It's also a positive statement in terms
of what the Fortune 500 companies and retired generals were saying:
"we need a rainbow of racial groupings within our companies that not
only reflect the society from which employees come, but also reflect
the customers to whom our business is directed." Taking the diversity
rationale as it's presented in these cases seems to me to be a
movement from the notion of defensive considerations rooted, of
course, in remedial purposes, to a positive statement. Will that
happen in the employment context? It could happen, at least with
respect to some places of employment, and I agree that police hiring
is the most likely sort of setting for that to happen.
Two, there's a component to the diversity rationale that we
haven't yet discussed very much and that's the notion of critical mass.
Diversity and critical mass of diverse racial groupings are tied
together in the University of Michigan cases. I'm wondering, as I
think about critical mass, what does that mean? Does it give some
content, some further definition, to the ambiguous notions of
diversity that we've talked about so far? I can see it as being used in
possibly two ways. One is to say that critical mass is the driver for
diversity, a rationale for an affirmative action plan. That is, we need
to have a critical mass even if that is above parity of work force
statistics versus labor market statistics, because even if the labor
market is small for Aleuts, as in the Croson case," it may be that a
critical mass of those folks in a particular employment setting is
important. Of course, the other way critical mass can work is to say
that it is a limitation on the rationale of diversity. Once Coca-Cola gets
a critical mass of, say, Chinese or Hispanics or some other group with
whom they are doing business, once there is a critical mass, does
Coca-Cola have the ability to engage in diversity based affirmative
action that will go beyond the level of critical mass within their
particular workforce? I don't know.
A third consideration to the diversity rationale is simply how far
can it go in terms of mirroring the racial rainbow that we have in this
country or that we see internationally? There is a case called Frank v.
Xerox Corp.34 that Monique was kind enough to point out to me in
which the Fifth Circuit said that you can't go that far; that's like the
33. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 (1989).
34. 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003).
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blind hiring by the numbers prohibited in the Johnson v.
Transportation Agency case.35 So, I'm not sure that employers really
will go so far as to say we're going to mirror the rainbow within
society or within the cultures we're trying to sell to. But Frank v.
Xerox Corp. is, at a minimum, a warning about taking it that far.
The final point on the theory, and this ties in with what Miranda
said, is the centrality of diversity of the workforce to the mission of
the employer. Police departments are very different from the types of
employers that we often see. Consider a local kosher meat market.
Can you imagine diversity of employment as a rationale for hiring
gentiles to work in the kosher meat market? Not likely. How about a
specialized internet company whose only direct dealings with the
public are over the internet, where none of us see race or gender or
anything else in terms of the people who work for the internet based
company. In the first context, the kosher meat market, we might say
there's an anti-diversity rationale. In the second one we've got not
only a faceless, but a raceless employer in terms of the external
presentation of that employer to the public.
Now, a little final point on this is there are some cases that aren't
affirmative action cases that may have something to say about
affirmative action in the workplace. BFOQ, for example. There are
some cases that even allow a racial BFOQ. I know Bob has been
around in this field long enough to know about the Texas Board of
Barber Examiners case.3 It's an old Fifth Circuit case where
authenticity and BFOQ reject diversity to present oneself and one's
products to customers.
Business necessity and diversity also tie in together. As I read
those briefs, business necessity is essentially what was argued by the
Fortune 500 companies. Business necessity doesn't justify intentional
discrimination, but certainly serves as a defense in disparate impact
cases. It's less helpful, I think, in the context of a diversity rationale
for affirmative action programs than some of the other concepts.
Anyway, let me talk for a minute about practical changes in the
employment area as a result of the University of Michigan cases. If
the cases had come out the opposite way and Michigan had been
slapped on the hand for what it did, it would have had an effect in the
workplace. It would have been a signal to employers to cut back on
affirmative action. With the result that came out, I don't see a
35. Id. at 137; see Johnson v. Trans. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637-38 (1986).
36. Miller v. Tex. St. Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980).
2004] THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 145
likelihood of much change. I have a good friend, with whom I was on
a panel a couple of weeks ago. He represents large employers and
said his clients are going to do the OFCCP stuff the same the day
after as the day before. The cases hadn't changed what his clients will
do. If anything, the cases were viewed as validating what they're
doing. They're already doing individualized considerations.
Small employer representatives and plaintiff's lawyers on the
same panel had this to say: We never argue affirmative action in our
litigation - never, ever. The plaintiff, black or white, who says I was
discriminated against, doesn't say it was because of the affirmative
action plan. What they tend to say is "I was discriminated against
because of my race or color. I wasn't treated fairly. I was the better
person for the job." The employer defends not by saying "we gave the
nod to someone else because of affirmative action." The employer
defends by saying "we picked the better qualified candidate." Here's
why. With a hundred different qualifications, surely you can find
some ways in which the person picked was, in fact, superior to the one
who wasn't, even if in other ways of course the other person was
superior.
Anyway, one last thought that troubles me about this whole
practical impact is we really have two communities who are
administering and deeply involved on the ground with employment
discrimination situations. The first community consists of
professionals who call themselves human resources personnel. These
folks are tied to affirmative action plans very carefully. They draw up
the plans, they administer the plans, they talk to the decision makers,
non-lawyers generally, about taking into account these factors in
making the decisions. They're the ones who see if things are getting
too far out of balance for one or another racial or gender group.
These folks, I think, aren't going to do business differently. They get,
as I said, a little bit of validation from the University of Michigan
cases, but they're going on doing what they're doing. On the other
hand, we have these litigation groups that I mentioned a while back.
They are going to see this as essentially irrelevant to what they do. So
you've got one community of folks involved in administering the law
that's looking at affirmative action stuff day in and day out and the
other group who, when something goes wrong, ignore it day in and
day out. I think that's very interesting.
Professor Robert Belton*: When I first received the invitation to
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. These comments have been
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participate on this panel I was pleased. When I woke up this morning
and realized that I had left my notes in Nashville, Tennessee, I was
not so pleased. So, I spent the greater part of the day trying to
reconstruct the points I wanted to make in connection with this
presentation. Let me start the presentation by raising a very
important subject: the issue of definition. What do we mean by
affirmative action? I have not seen a Supreme Court decision yet that
gives us a definition of what affirmation action is, and because we do
not have some working notion, some common notion, of what we
mean by "affirmative action," we tend to talk past each other on this
subject matter. So what I intend to do is try to define that concept in
the sense that I use it. I tend to think about affirmative action in
terms of a plan that takes race and sex into account as one factor as a
remedy for past, present or continuing discrimination. And, of course,
that definition embraces within it some notion of societal
discrimination.
Another observation that I want to make focuses on this notion
of diversity, which is very big in the Grutter case. The thing that
intrigues me about the notion of diversity, and again I am not so sure
we have a working definition of what that means for the purpose of a
meaningful discussion, but the thing that intrigues me about this
notion of diversity is that it is a concept that began to take on a life of
its own after policies of affirmative action became controversial. We
do not like to use the term "affirmative action" any more because it
has such a negative connotation. Therefore, we tend to see the word
"diversity" being used more frequently now than we do the term
"affirmative action."
A third preliminary point I want to make is that we speak about
our national policy as one embracing the notion of equality. One
conception of this notion of equality is that race or sex should not be
a factor in the allocation of goods and services in our society. That is a
very popular conception in this notion of equality. And when we
compare that notion of equality with a concept of diversity, I think all
of us accept the fact that the notion of diversity that says it is okay
under some circumstances to take race and sex into account.
Arguably these conflicting approaches - equality and diversity - raise
and the question of whether these policies can peacefully coexist.
One says race and sex can not be taken into account, and the other
says it is okay. The question becomes, when you take a look at a case
lightly edited.
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like Grutter, is there any way to accommodate both the emphasis on
equality, as I've defined it, and diversity, as I've defined it as well?
My major comments focus primarily on whether Grutter has any
relevancy to the private sector. At one level, I think the answer is
yes, looking at it from the perspective of Title VII. The answer is yes
because, to the extent we are talking about a public employer, we all
know that public employers are subject to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. What the Court had to say
both in Gratz and Grutter has some relevancy to public employers.
We also know that the mistake that the plaintiff in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency37made was to not include a count under the
Equal Protection Clause. Any lawyer who would represent a
Johnson-type plaintiff in the future affirmative action case would be
subject to disbarment if that lawyer did not include a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause. But I want to put that type of case aside
because I think some of the problems that we have discussed already
would be applicable to public employers in that context.
I want to look at the purely private side from a perspective of
Title VII, and the question could be framed in terms of, to what
extent does Grutter displace or make irrelevant the jurisprudence on
affirmative action from the Title VII perspective? I think the answer
is that with the model I'm talking about now, it does not make any
difference. In the leading cases on the Title VII side, Steelworkers v.
Weber" and Johnson, the Court enunciated a different test for
determining the legality of voluntary affirmative action when
challenged on Title VII grounds alone, and the Weber-Johnson test is
entirely different from the strict scrutiny test that is applied in equal
protection cases.
There are a couple of sections of Title VII that are relevant to
my point about Grutter not having that much relevance in the purely
private cases. It seems to me that if the Court is going to displace its
Title VII jurisprudence on affirmative action that it adopted in the
Weber and Johnson cases, it is going to be necessary for the Court to
revisit its decision in Washington v. Davis.39 Let me tell you why I say
that. We all know that the basic proposition from Washington v.
Davis is that the disparate impact theory is inapplicable to claims
37. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
38. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
39. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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based on the Equal Protection Clause.40 But the thing that has always
troubled me about Washington v. Davis is the underlying rationale
that the Supreme Court relied upon in reaching its result. The clear
implication to me is that the Court is saying it was not going to apply
disparate impact theory to claims based on the Equal Protection
Clause because it thinks the nature of the discrimination that is
prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause is different from the
nature of discrimination that is prohibited under Title VII. And my
interpretation of Washington v. Davis, along this line, has always
troubled me. I want to take this line of reasoning even further. In
adopting the intent or purposeful discrimination standard in
Washington v. Davis, the Court raises the question of whether that
standard is different from the intent theory that we have in Title VII.
I am not so sure that we have a clear answer to that question, but it
seems to me the Court is saying that we are going to treat the nature
of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause as different from
the nature of discrimination that is prohibited by Title VII. And if
there is merit to that reading of Davis, and I think there is, it seems to
me that the Court is going to have to go back and revisit its rationale
in Davis in deciding whether it is going to apply Grutter,41 Gratz,42
Croson,43 and Adarand" in full force to the Title VII private sector
discrimination cases.
The other point I want to make, again looking at the Title VII
statute, focuses on Civil Rights Act of 1991, Section 116. Section 116
provides that the 1991 amendments were not intended to overrule,
among other things, affirmative action that is in accordance with the
law.45 The key phrase is "in accordance with the law." There's a big
debate now as to the meaning of "in accordance with the law," and
the key question is what does this phrase means. Also part of the
debate is grounded in another provision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
section 703(m). Section 703(m) says that if a plaintiff proves that race
or sex was a motivating factor, that's the key phrase, then you
establish a violation and you go on to talk about the appropriate
remedy.46 There was some argument that section 703(m) sounded the
40. Id. at 239.
41. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
42. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
43. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
44. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
45. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(B)(2002).
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death knell for affirmative action plans, because affirmative action
plans, by definition, necessarily take race and sex into account in the
allocation of jobs, of goods and services in our society. So, again the
question becomes, how do we factor these statutory provisions into a
discussion about the applicability of Grutter and Gratz to the private
sector?
There is yet another provision in Title VII that we have to take
into account as we think through the implications of Grutter for the
private sector, and that is section 703(j), the so-called anti-
preferential treatment provision of Title VII. 4 7 I do not know where
the Court stands on the proper interpretation of 703(j), since the
Court has given two or three different interpretations of section
703(j).48 And let me say this about Justice O'Connor, and it shows up
in a couple of her opinions in terms of interpretations of section
703(j). Justice O'Connor said in Price Waterhouse,4 9 and said very
clearly in Watson,so that she is not going to construe section 703(j) to
mean that employers are going to have to engage in quotas to stay out
of trouble. I don't know how she would ultimately come out in an
attempt to harmonize her views on section 703(j) and section 116. But
we do have to take into account these provisions that I've just
indicated in trying to think through what the implication of Grutter is
for the private sector.
I think one of the big differences between equal protection, on
the one hand, and Title VII, on the other hand, has to do with the
legitimacy of the rationale for an affirmative action plan. More
specifically, concerning this notion of societal discrimination, I am
always intrigued by the fact that often when I see that term used by
the Supreme Court in equal protection or civil rights cases, it is in
quotes. But the bottom line for me, as I said before, is that unless the
Supreme Court is willing to go back and redo a lot of the Title VII
jurisprudence, I am not so sure that Grutter will have that much
implication for the Title VII side.
And Charles, I must on this diversity issue just mention this.
Two situations. A police department wants to do an investigation of
the Ku Klux Klan and I am, as an African-American, a member of
47. Id. § 2000 e-2(j).
48. Compare, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977) (liberally
construing section 703(j) in favor of plaintiffs) with Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 652 (1989)(construing section 703(j) in favor of employers).
49. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 230 (1989).
50. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988).
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that police department. The department is not going to send me.
Right? Is that diversity? Or, if the police department wants to do an
investigation of the Nation of Islam, are they going to send my co-
panelist, Professor Charles Shanor, a white male? Is that diversity?
